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ABSTRACT
The emergence of e-commerce and e-voting platforms has resulted in the rise in the volume of
sensitive information over the Internet. This has resulted in an increased demand for secure and
private means of information computation. Towards this, the Yao’s Millionaires’ problem, i.e., to
determine the richer among two millionaires’ securely, finds an application. In this work, we present
a new solution to the Yao’s Millionaires’ problem namely, Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC).
We show that PPC achieves this comparison in constant time as well as in one execution. PPC uses
semi-honest third parties for the comparison who do not learn any information about the values.
Further, we show that PPC is collusion-resistance. To demonstrate the significance of PPC, we
present a secure, approximate single-minded combinatorial auction, which we call TPACAS, i.e.,
Truthful, Privacy-preserving Approximate Combinatorial Auction for Single-minded bidders. We
show that TPACAS, unlike previous works, preserves the following privacies relevant to an auction:
agent privacy, the identities of the losing bidders must not be revealed to any other agent except the
auctioneer (AU), bid privacy, the bid values must be hidden from the other agents as well as the AU
and bid-topology privacy, the items for which the agents are bidding must be hidden from the other
agents as well as the AU. We demonstrate the practicality of TPACAS through simulations. Lastly,
we also look at TPACAS’ implementation over a publicly distributed ledger, such as the Ethereum
blockchain.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, different e-commerce and e-voting platforms have grown in popularity. Consequently, the need for
privacy of the information exchange within these platforms has become imperative. The consumers (or voters), being
strategic agents, prefer the preservation of their private information (bids, votes, etc.) as well as their public identities
from other (often) competitive agents. This anonymity of information also increases participation.
With blockchain gaining momentum, e-commerce and e-voting are now being conducted as smart contracts over
distributed platforms such as Ethereum. A smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify,
or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract [1]. Since these protocols on the blockchain are on a publicly
distributed ledger, they are open to any interested agent, while making the agent’s bid/vote as well the execution of its
payments publicly verifiable, transparent as well as pseudo-anonymous. However, a consequence of this is that even
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an agent’s private information is publicly available for anyone to see and use. This further necessitates the need for
privacy-preserving e-commerce/e-voting protocols, over blockchain.
At the heart of e-commerce/e-voting protocols is the comparison of two values, either in the form of a bid or a
vote. Therefore, in order to build a protocol that preserves each agent’s private information, we require a method for
comparing these values while preserving their privacy1. In the literature, this challenge is similar to Yao’s Millionaires’
problem (Yao [3]) of securely determining the richer between two different parties and has been extensively studied.
1.1 Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem
Introduced in 1982 by Yao [3], the Millionaires’ problem discusses two agents (millionaires), Alice and Bob, who are
interested in knowing the richer among them – without revealing their true wealth. The first solution to the problem,
Yao [3], is computationally expensive and requires large memory. Thereafter, several protocols with great improvement
have been proposed [4, 5, 6, 7]. However, each comparison through these protocols is at best linear in order of the
length of the binary representation of these numbers and may also involve multiple rounds of computation. This makes
the process computationally expensive for e-commerce/e-voting applications. Further, these protocols require the
continuous involvement of agents. Assigning trusted third parties to take part in the protocol on behalf of the agents
would reveal the agent’s private information to them.
In this paper, we introduce a novel method for comparing two integers x and y (i.e., x, y ∈ Z) securely, i.e., a solution
to the Yao’s Millionaires’ problem, namely, Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC). In PPC, we assume that there are
approved cryptographic notaries in the system which act as semi-trusted third parties to assist the central server (CS)
to determine whether x ≥ y or not. We show that neither the CS nor the notaries learn any information regarding the
values of x and y during or after the comparison.
We achieve this secure comparison in constant time, i.e., the complexity of our method is O(1) per comparison.
Further, we show that our solution is collusion resistant. We use Pedersen commitment [8] of the values to provide
zero-knowledge proof for the verifiability of the comparison. We illustrate the utility of our method by using it to
build a privacy-preserving protocol for single-minded combinatorial auction, which we call TPACAS, i.e., Truthful,
Privacy-preserving Approximate Combinatorial Auction with Single-minded bidders.
1.2 Secure Combinatorial Auctions
Auctions are mechanisms which facilitate the buying and selling of goods/items among a group of agents. In general, a
combinatorial auction, where the agents can bid for combination(s) of items, yields a higher revenue than selling the
items individually. For example, different governments across the globe have been using combinatorial auctions to
lease out wireless spectrum [9] or allocate airport landing take-off slots to interested agents [10]. In such auctions, the
participating entities, which we refer as agents throughout the paper, desire different types of privacy, as the information
they submit may expose their business plans to their competitors. For example, the disclosure of an agent’s public
identity reveals its interest in acquiring the items auctioned. The revelation of an agent’s bidding information (bid value
and the combination of preferred items) to an auctioneer or other participating agents may expose its profits, economic
situations and preferences for specific items to its competitors. The competitors may further exploit this information
in future auctions. In consequence, an auction protocol should be such that only the winning agents’ combination of
preferred items is made public while preserving the privacy of the identities and the bidding information of the other
agents.
Auction protocols which preserve the privacy of bidding information are called secure auction protocols. In this paper,
we define these desirable privacies of a secure auction in three types: (i) Agent privacy, an agent’s participation in an
auction must be hidden from all the other agents; (ii) Bid privacy, the bid values must be hidden from the other agents
as well as the auctioneer; (iii) Bid-topology privacy, the items for which the agents are bidding must be hidden from the
other agents as well as the auctioneer.
Furthermore, if the bidding information is hidden from the agents as well as the auctioneer, we need a trustworthy
implementation of a secure auction. That is, anybody should be able to verify the correctness of the allocations and that
the payments are in alignment with the described rules. Besides, the implementation must preserve all the three types of
privacies with high probability. Motivated by these challenges, we focus on the preservation of privacy of all agents’
bidding information in an instance of a combinatorial auction.
Typically, the goal in such auctions is to maximize the social welfare, i.e., we should allocate these resources to those
who value them most. Strategic agents may misreport their valuations to maximize their profits. Thus, we look for
1The preliminary idea of using secure comparison for designing privacy-preserving auctions has been published in [2].
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auctions which, through appropriate payment rules, ensure that the agents bid their true valuation. In game theory,
such auction protocols (allocation rule along with payment rule) are called dominant strategy incentive compatible.
In addition to this, auction protocols must also be individually rational i.e., protocols wherein the agents have a
non-negative payoff.
Combinatorial auctions have an exponential number of possible valuations for each agent and are NP-Complete [11].
Hence, we focus on a single-minded case. In this, the agents are interested in a single specific bundle of items and obtain
a particular value if they get the whole bundle (or any super-set) and zero otherwise. Even single-minded combinatorial
auctions, being NP-Hard [12], are solved approximately. In particular, Lehmann et al. [13] propose a strategic proof
mechanism for such auctions, which gives
√
m-approximate allocation and payment rule, which we refer to as ICA-SM
(Incentive Compatible Approximate auctions for Single-minded bidders). Here, m denotes the number of items being
auctioned. In this paper, we propose TPACAS (Truthful, Privacy-preserving, an Approximately efficient Combinatorial
Auction for Single-minded bidders), which solves a single-minded combinatorial auction, preserving the cryptographic
and game theoretic properties mentioned earlier, i.e., TPACAS is a trustworthy implementation of ICA-SM.
One can leverage the approach of Micali and Rabin [14] which uses homomorphic property of the commitments or
Parkes et al. [15] which also uses time-lapse cryptography to achieve winner determination while preserving the privacy
of the agents and their bidding information. However, these protocols expose the bidding information to the auctioneer
after the bidding phase is over. We overcome these issues by proposing the use of notaries. We assume there are
approved cryptographic notaries in the system and the auctioneer can appoint them in assisting in the auction. In
TPACAS, the auctioneer assigns a signed random id for each agent and a set of randomly chosen notaries. The agents
commit their bid values and the size of the bundle in which they are interested similar to [14]. The challenge remains to
sort the bids or to check if two agents have any item in common while keeping the values and bid topology private.
Towards this, we use our novel method for secure comparison of two integers, i.e., PPC.
Through this method, we show how to sort as well as compare the bidding information of agents without revealing them,
with the help of notaries. The notaries do not learn of any bidding information. We assume that each agent’s bundle
size is ≥ 2. Otherwise, bid-topology will get revealed to the auctioneer in our protocol. Note that in our protocol, the
notary’s role is only to assist the auctioneer in determining winners and their payments when the bidding information is
hidden. The notaries will not know the agent identities or their bidding information.
1.3 Adversary Model
As defined in literature (refer [16]), and as standard in solutions for Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem (eg., [5, 4, 17, 18]), in
this paper, we assume that all agents, i.e., Alice, Bob, auctioneer, notaries etc., are semi-honest or honest-but-curious.
This implies that while these agents can observe and cipher any information, they do not deviate from the defined
protocol. We use semi-honest and honest-but-curious interchangeably throughout the paper.
1.4 Contributions
The following are our contributions:
• We present a secure, robust and verifiable method, Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC), for securely
comparing two integers (Procedures 2 and 3). We show that the method preserves the privacy of the two
integers unless 3 out of 5 parties collude.
• We propose a cryptographic protocol, TPACAS, that implements a truthful single-minded combinatorial
auction (Theorem 1). It is
√
m-approximate and preserves agent privacy of all the losing agents from rest of
the agents (Proposition 1). It preserves bid privacy with high probability, and the auctioneer will not know
any bid value even after the auction is over (Proposition 2). It also preserves bid-topology privacy from the
notaries (Proposition 3) as well as the auctioneer with high probability (Proposition 4).
• We believe PPC can be further used to implement other privacy-preserving mechanisms such as other type of
auctions, voting etc.
1.5 Paper Overview
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the existing results for the Millionaire problem and secure
auctions, Section 3 describes the relevant cryptographic techniques as well as the auction setting; Section 4 introduces
our novel method for secure comparison of two integers, i.e., PPC, Section 5 presents the TPACAS auction protocol;
and Section 6 analyzes it. We conclude and summarize the paper in Section 7.
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2 Related Work
In this section, we summarize the related literature for (i) Millionaires’ Problem; and (ii) Secure Auctions.
2.1 Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem
The problem was first introduced by Yao [3] along with its first solution. However, the presented solution is exponential
in time and space. After this, most of the solutions Chaum et. al. [19], Beaver and Godwasser [20] have focused on
using multi-party circuit computations. Grigoriev and Shpilrain [21] use various laws of classical physics to present
various solutions to the problem. These solutions are irrelevant to an online setting, while also being time consuming
for e-commerce/e-voting applications. In this paper, we focus on solutions which can deployed be in an online setting.
Ioannidis and Grama [7] present a two-round protocol which is polynomial while Lin and Tzeng [5] and Blake and
Kolesnikov [4] provide a single-round solution which is linear in the order of the length of the integers to be compared.
For their solutions, [7] uses complex bitwise operators while [5, 4] use Paillier homomorphic encryptions and zero-
knowledge proof. The computational cost per comparison in [5] is (4b+1)(log p)+ 6b and in [4] is 5b(log p)+ 4b− 6,
where b is the bit number and p modulus of the Paillier scheme. Recently, Liu et. al. [18] proposed a single-round
solution using Paillier encryption and vectorization method. However, the solution is of the order 2(s+ 2)log p, where
s is the vector dimension.
These solutions also require the owners of the integers to do complex operations. Given the number of potential compar-
isons needed for e-commerce/e-voting applications, continuous involvement of the owners is infeasible. Additionally,
one can not simply assign trusted third parties for the operations as that would reveal the owners’ private information to
them.
2.2 Secure Auctions
VCG mechanisms were proposed by Vickrey [22], Clarke [23] and Graves [24]. As the allocation problem in a general
combinatorial auction is NP-Complete, Lehmann et. al. [13] states a strategy proof, approximate greedy mechanism to
solve the allocation problem in a restricted setting, without preserving bid privacy. Following the impossibility result
on unconditional privacy Brandt and Sandholm [25], much of the research has targeted to achieve privacy based on
computational hardness of certain problems like discrete-log problem.
Micali and Rabin [14] solves single-item and multi-unit auctions while preserving the privacy of the bids using Pedersen
commitment, but reveal the bid information to the auctioneer after the end of the bidding phase, whereas Parkes et.
al. [15] uses Paillier encryption and time-lapse cryptography for the same. [26] gives a practical, multi-unit auction
that does not reveal any private information to a third party, even after the auction closes. Naor et. al. [27] uses an
auction issuer while Franklin and Reiter [28] uses multiple servers as trusted third parties to solve auctions securely. In
both these protocols, the bid-topology is revealed to these third parties. Parkes et. al. [29] uses clock-proxy auction to
solve a privacy-preserving combinatorial auction, revealing private information to the auctioneer after the end of the
clock phase. The protocol is linear in size of the original computational time, from exponential. Suzuki and Yokoo
[30] proposes a privacy-preserving, secure combinatorial auction without revealing any bid information to a third party,
using dynamic programming, and [31] extends it to add verifiability. The protocol, however, is exponential in size of
the number of bids and is thus impractical even for a small number of bids.
3 Preliminaries
In Section 3.1, we provide the cryptographic background required for the results; and in Section 3.2, we describe the
auction setting with the relevant cryptographic and game-theoretic properties.
3.1 Cryptographic Background
For the design of our method for secure comparison of two integers, the following cryptographic techniques are required.
3.1.1 Pedersen Commitment Scheme
Commitment functions are functions that allow one to commit to a chosen value (or chosen statement) while keeping it
hidden to others, with the ability to reveal the committed value later.
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Let p and q denote large primes such that q divides p − 1, Gq as the unique subgroup of Z∗p of order q, and g as a
generator of Gq . Also, let g and h = ga(mod p) be elements of Gq such that loggh is intractable, where a ∈ Zq is the
secret key.
Definition 1. A Pedersen commitment scheme is the commitment of a message x ∈ Zq, with a random help value
r ∈ Zq , as,
E(x, r) = gxhr (mod p).
Definition 1 follows from [8]. Note that, this commitment scheme is information theoretically hiding i.e., given a
commitment E(·), every value x is equally likely to be the value committed in E(·); computationally binding i.e., an
adversary can not find two distinct x and x′ which open the same commitment E(·), unless it can solve the discrete-log
problem; and is homomorphic i.e., given only the public keys (p, q, g and h) and the commitments of x1 and x2, one
can compute the commitment of x1 ± x2.
Let ai denote an agent i’s secret key. Thus, every agent i’s set of public keys is represented by the set Pi =
{p, q, g and hi} ∀i ∈ A .
3.1.2 Random Number Representation
As standard in the literature (eg., [14]), we use random number representation of a number x, R(x).
Definition 2. A random number representation of a number x, R(x), is a representation of x as the pair (u, v) where
u, v ∈ Zq and x = (u+ v) mod q.
To find R(x) of a number x, any agent randomly chooses u and then picks v = (x− u)mod q. In this, with only u or v,
no information about the value of x can be deduced.
Notation. In this paper, E(R(x)) represents the Pedersen commitment of x as R(x) = (u, v), i.e., E(R(x)) denotes
the pair of commitments
(
E(u, r), E(v, r′)
)
.
3.1.3 Zero-knowledge proof
In cryptography, Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a method by which an agent, called a Prover (P), is able to convince
another agent, called a Verifier (V), that it knows some information x, without revealing x (or any other information
related to x) [32]. Further, V cannot prove to any other party that P knows x. Informally, ZKP’s allows P to reveal its
knowledge of some information, without giving out that information.
In this paper, we model ZKP as an interaction (exchange of messages) between P and V . To this, a ZKP must satisfy
the following three properties [32]. Here, a honest agent is the one which follows the protocol (proof) correctly.
• Completeness. A honest P will be able to convince a honest V that the statement is true, if it is true.
• Soundness. No dis-honest P can convince a honest V that the statement is true, if it is false, with high
probability.
• Zero-knowledge. No V is able to learn any information regarding the statement, except that it is true, in the
case that the statement is true.
3.1.4 Value Comparison
We now look at a method for comparing two values i.e., to find out whether or not x > y, when x, y < q/2. As shown
in [14], x − y ≤ q/2 ⇐⇒ x ≥ y and x − y > q/2 ⇐⇒ x < y. Therefore, to compare x and y we only need to
check whether x− y ≤ q/2.
3.1.5 Cryptographic Notaries
Similar to [15], cryptographic notaries are reputable agents, such as law firms, accountants, or firms specializing in
providing means of communication of information among agents.
3.1.6 Secure Information Exchange
Similar to [33], we define an information exchange as secure if it is done over an anonymous and confidential channel.
Towards this, Tor hidden services [34] or SSH connections [35] can be used.
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3.2 Auction Design
We are considering a situation where an auctioneer (AU ), the seller itself, is interested in selling M = {1, . . . ,m}
indivisible items and there are B = {b1, . . . , bnˆ} (|B| = nˆ ≥ 2) interested and strategic agents via a combinatorial
auction. We assume there exists a set of cryptographic notaries N , described in the next section, that can assist AU in
determining the winners and their payments. We denote the set consisting of every participating agent in this protocol
as A i.e., A = {{AU} ∪B ∪N}.
Combinatorial auctions factor in the inter-dependency of the values to an agent with respect to the different combinations
possible i.e., each agent has a different preference for different subsets. The valuation function ϑbi describes these
preferences ∀bi ∈ B. In absence of payments, the agent bi may boast about ϑbi . We denote its payment as σbi . Formally,
for each possible subset S ∈ Q (Q = 2M), ϑbi is a real-valued function such that ϑbi(S) is the value an agent bi
obtains if he wins the subset S. Also, if σbi is the price paid by the agent for the subset, then its utility is given by
ψbi(·) = ϑbi(S)− σbi(·).
3.2.1 Cryptographic Properties in Auction
Auction protocols must preserve the privacy of the bidding information from all the agents, including the auctioneer,
even after the closing of the bidding phase while providing verifiability of the correctness of the allocation and the
payments. In this subsection, we describe these required cryptographic properties of an auction protocol.
• Non-repudiation. This deals with the inability of an auctioneer or an agent to retract from their actions.
Auction protocols must be able to commit an agent to its bid as well as prove the exclusion of any bid by the
auctioneer.
• Verifiability. The public, including the agents, must be shown a conclusive proof of the correctness of the
auction protocol. The protocol must enforce correctness; an auctioneer should not be able to present valid
proofs for invalid winners or incorrect payments.
• Privacy. An auction protocol should hide bidding information of an agent from the other participating agents.
After the auction, only the information revealed from the winning agents should be known. The types of
privacies relevant for an auction are defined below. For this, let W be the set of winning agents.
Definition 3 (Agent Privacy). No agent should be able to discover each others identity i.e., for an agent a ∈ A
during the auction and for an agent a ∈ A \W after the auction, no other agent b ∈ A \ {a,AU} should
know about a’s participation in the auction.
Definition 4 (Bid Privacy). No agent should be able to know any agent’s bid valuation i.e., the probability
with which an agent a ∈ A \ {bi} can guess agent bi’s bid valuation ϑbi is 1/ϑbi .
Definition 5 (Bid-Topology Privacy). No agent should be able to know any other agent’s bundle of items i.e.,
the probability with which an agent a ∈ A \ {bi} can guess the item bundle Sbi of an agent bi ∈ B \ {a}
during the auction and of an agent bi ∈ B \ {{a} ∪W} after the auction is negligible [36] in the number of
items being auctioned.
Let us say that the allocation of the items is determined by an allocation rule k(·), which takes ϑ = (ϑbi , ϑ−bi) as
the input and outputs who gets which items, where ϑ−bi denotes the set of valuations of agents not including bi. The
payment rule is given by σ = (σb1(·), σb2(·), . . . , σbn(·)). Thus, an auction is characterized by (k, σ), an allocation
rule and the payment rule. Given an auction, we need the following game theoretic properties to be satisfied.
3.2.2 Game Theoretic Properties in Auction
The valuations of each agent is its private information i.e., hidden from every other agent in the auction. This opens the
door for any such agent to lie about their valuations for their benefit. Thus, we look for auctions which incentivize an
agent to bid for its true valuation. In mechanism design theory, such truthful auctions are called dominant strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC). Further, an auction is ex-post individually rational (IR) if every agent bi always gets
non-negative utility.
Definition 6 (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible). An auction (k, σ) is DSIC if ∀ϑ−bi , ∀ϑ′bi ,∀bi ∈ B, we have
ϑbi
(
k(·))− σbi(ϑ−bi , ϑbi) ≥ ϑbi(k′(·))− σbi(ϑ−bi , ϑ′bi)
where k(·) = k(ϑ−bi , ϑbi) and k′(·) = k(ϑ−bi , ϑ′bi).
Definition 7 (Individually Rationality). An auction (k, σ) is ex-post individually rational if ∀bi ∈ B, we have
ϑbi
(
k(ϑb1 , . . . , ϑbnˆ)
)− σbi(ϑb1 , . . . , ϑbnˆ) ≥ 0 ∀ϑ−bi .
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As the allocation problem in this setting is NP-Complete and because of the difficulty in representing and communicating
valuation functions of each agent (since these are exponential in size) in it, we look for much simpler cases of auctions
such as the single-minded case.
3.2.3 The Single-Minded Case
These are auctions wherein agents are interested in a single specific bundle of items, and get a scalar value if they get
this whole bundle (or any super-set) and get zero value for any other bundle. Formally,
Definition 8. A single-minded valuation function is a function in which there exists a bundle of items S∗ and a value
ϑ∗ such that ϑ(S) = ϑ∗, ∀S ⊇ S∗ and ϑ(S) = 0 for all other S. Here, a single-minded bid is the pair (S∗, ϑ∗).
As the allocation problem in this case is NP-Hard, we look at algorithms which can solve this approximately. An
algorithm, in an auction setting, is a α-approximation algorithm if an allocation generated by the algorithm is always
less than a factor α times the value of the optimal allocation. We now discuss one such algorithm.
3.2.4 An Incentive Compatible approximation Algorithm (ICA-SM)
Algorithm 1 describes ICA-SM, which is a greedy algorithm that solves the allocation problem for single-minded case
with n agents, m items, ϑbi and Sbi as agent bi’s bid valuation and preferred bundle of items, with W as the set of
winners approximately. ICA-SM is computationally efficient, incentive compatible and is
√
m-approximate [13].
Algorithm 1: ICA-SM Algorithm
1. Initialization:
• Sort the agents according to the order : ϑ∗b1/
√
|S∗b1 | ≥ ϑ∗b2/
√
|S∗b2 | ≥ · · · ≥ ϑ∗bnˆ/
√
|S∗bnˆ |
• W ← ∅
2. For i : 1→ nˆ, if S∗bi ∩ (∪bj∈WS∗bj ) = ∅ then W ←W ∪ {bi}
3. Output:
• Allocation: The set of winners is W .
• Payments: ∀bi ∈W,σbi = ϑ∗bj/
√
|S∗bj |/|S∗bi | where j is the smallest index such that S∗bi ∩ S∗bj 6= ∅, and
for all k < j, bk 6= bi, S∗bk ∩ S∗bj = ∅. If no such j exists then σbi = 0.
We refer to an auction protocol satisfying all the aforementioned game theoretic and cryptographic properties as a
trustworthy implementation of an auction, i.e.,
Definition 9 (Trustworthy Implementation). An auction protocol which provides non-repudiation and verifiability,
while preserving agent privacy, bid privacy, and bid-topology privacy; along with being dominant strategy incentive
compatible and individually rational, is a trustworthy implementation of an auction.
In the next section, we present our method for secure comparison of two integers. In the subsequent subsection, we
show the verifiability of the comparison using ZKP.
4 Privacy Preserving Comparison of Two Integers
In this section, we first describe a procedure for secure comparison of two integers x and y owned by two agents Alice
(say) and Bob (say), respectively. We assume that Alice and Bob have already agreed that x, y < q/2. Additionally, we
assume that there exists a central server (CS) that co-ordinates the comparison. Note that, and as shown later, the CS
only aids the comparison and does not learn anything about the values of x and y. Procedure 1 describes the comparison
[2].
Procedure 1 preserves privacy of the values x and y from CS since CS only knows the values val1 and val2. It is
trivial to see that CS shall not be able to find anything about the values of (u1, v1) and (u2, v2) from these, hence no
information about x or y is revealed to it. In addition, every notary only has one component of the other agent’s value,
which implies that it can not either find out anything about the other agent’s value.
Further, Procedure 1 is independent of the length of the binary representation of x or y and hence is of constant order
(O(1)) in computational time. The secure comparison is achieved in one execution of Procedure 1.
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Procedure 1: Secure Value Comparison of Two Integers
1 CS assigns Alice and Bob their respective pair of distinct notaries. Let, (n1Alice, n
2
Alice) and (n
1
Bob, n
2
Bob) be Alice and
Bob’s pair of assigned notaries, respectively.
Steps
i Alice generates R(x) = (u1, v1) and Bob generates R(y) = (u2, v2).
ii
Alice u1−→ n1Alice
Alice v1−→ n2Alice
Bob u2−→ n1Bob
Bob v2−→ n2Bob
All information exchange takes place securely.
iii
n1Bob
u2−→ n1Alice
n2Bob
v2−→ n2Alice
All information exchange takes place securely.
iv
n1Alice
val1=(u1−u2) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CS
n2Alice
val2=(v1−v2) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CS
All information exchange takes place securely.
v CS then checks the following,
if (val1 + val2) mod q = 0 return “equal”
if (val1 + val2) mod q < q/2 return “ > ”
else return “ < ”
Discussion. By using x−y, i.e., val1+val2, to compare x and y we are able to preserve the privacy of the values x and
y. However, using Procedure 1 to design secure mechanisms for applications such as auctions/voting may lead to loss
of privacy of the values. For instance, in secure auctions, the bids of the winning agents are opened to determine their
payments. This will lead to the disclosure of one value, say x, which will consequently disclose y to the CS through the
known value x− y. Thus, we must also hide the value x− y from the CS while still preserving the comparison.
4.1 Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC)
To overcome the potential loss of the privacy of the values x and y in secure comparison through Procedure 1, we
introduce another novel procedure, namely, Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC). Towards this, we assume that Alice
and Bob have already agreed that x, y < q2·Dmax . Here, Dmax = d
2
max for dmax = 2
|dmax| where |dmax| is number of
bits required to represent dmax. In PPC, we require Alice and Bob to privately select an integer dAlice, dBob ∈ [1, dmax],
respectively. Let, D = (dAlice · dBob) mod q.
Before describing PPC, we present the following claim,
Claim 1. D · (val1 + val2) mod q ≤ q/2 ⇐⇒ x ≥ y and D · (val1 + val2) mod q > q/2 ⇐⇒ x < y. Here,
R(x) = (u1, v1), R(y) = (u2, v2), val1 = (u1−u2) mod q, val2 = (v1−v2) mod q and D = (dAlice ·dBob) mod q
with x, y < q2·Dmax .
Proof. Observe that,
(x− y) mod q = (u1 + v1)− (u2 + v2)
= (u1 − u2) + (v1 − v2)
= (val1 + val2) mod q.
We know from [14]: x− y ≤ q/2 ⇐⇒ x ≥ y and x− y > q/2 ⇐⇒ x < y. For this, x, y < q/2. Now,
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• To show D · (val1 + val2) mod q ≤ q/2 ⇐⇒ x ≥ y: Trivially, if x, y < q2·D and x ≥ y, we have
(x− y) mod q ≤ q
2 ·D ⇒ D · (x− y) mod q ≤
q
2
.
Further, if,
D · (x− y) mod q ≤ q
2
⇒ (x− y) mod q ≤ q
2 ·D ⇒ x ≥ y.
• To show D · (val1 + val2) mod q > q/2 ⇐⇒ x < y: Similarly, if x, y > q2·D and x < y, we have
(x− y) mod > q
2 ·D ⇒ D · (x− y) mod q >
q
2
.
Further, if,
D · (x− y) mod q > q
2
⇒ (x− y) mod q > q
2 ·D ⇒ x < y.
The rest of the claim follows from the fact that as Dmax ≥ D ⇒ q2·Dmax ≤
q
2·D .
With this claim, we now present our novel method for securely comparing two integers, namely, PPC.
4.1.1 PPC Procedure
Procedure 2 describes the steps taken by Alice and Bob in co-ordination with the CS in PPC. The pair of encryption
given at the start and the help values send to the notaries are used for verification of the comparison as shown in Section
4.1.2.
Procedure 2 preserves privacy of the values x and y from CS since CS only knows the values2 (D · val1) mod q and
(D · val2) mod q. It is trivial to see that CS shall not be able to find anything about the values of (u1, v1) and (u2, v2)
from these, hence no information about x or y is revealed to it. In addition, every notary only has one component of the
other agent’s (Alice or Bob) value, which implies that it can not either find out anything about the other agent’s value.
The commitments passed as inputs provide for verifiability of the comparison, as described in the next subsection.
Note that, PPC is independent of the length of the binary representation of x or y and hence is of constant order (O(1))
in computational time. Further, the secure comparison is achieved in one execution of Procedure 2. Figure 1 represents
the information flow during Procedure 2, schematically.
Privacy Analysis.
• In PPC, by comparing with X + Y , we preserve the value of x− y. Thus, we make sure that even in the event
that one of x or y is revealed, the other value is not. Moreover, as D is the product of two random integers
owned by Alice and Bob, separately, no one agent can determine the others’ value through X + Y .
• Note that, as dmax is publicly known, x− y will be an integer in the range [X+YDmax , X + Y ]. Thus the value
of X + Y bounds the value of x− y. However, the probability of guessing the value of x− y, from X + Y ,
can be made negligible by appropriately setting the value for dmax. For instance, q of the order of 128 bits
and dmax of the order 32 bits, implies that x − y can take values of the order 64 bits. This results in 264
possibilities for x− y, i.e., the probability of guessing x− y is negligible.
Moreover, as PPC is independent of the order of x, y, and q, one can increase the order of the numbers
to further decrease the probability of guessing x − y from X + Y without significantly increasing the
computational cost.
• Thus, PPC can be used to design privacy preserving mechanisms like auctions/voting. We illustrate the same
with TPACAS (Section 5).
4.1.2 PPC Verification
Under the assumption that all agents are honest-but-curious, Procedure 2 not only preserves the privacy of the values
but also ensures the correctness of the comparison. Moreover, the secure comparison is in constant time. We now relax
this assumption by assuming Alice and Bob to be strategic agents, i.e., they may misreport the values passed to their
2For the modular multiplication of a · b (mod q), where q is a prime and no information of a is known, all possible values of b are
equally likely.
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Procedure 2: Privacy Preserving Comparison (PPC)
1 CS assigns Alice and Bob their respective pair of distinct notaries. Let, (n1Alice, n
2
Alice) and (n
1
Bob, n
2
Bob) be Alice and
Bob’s pair of assigned notaries, respectively.
Steps
i Alice generates R(x) = (u1, v1) and E(R(x)) while Bob generates R(y) = (u2, v2) and E(R(y)). Then,
Alice
E(R(x))−−−−−→ CS
Bob
E(R(y))−−−−−→ CS
ii
Alice
u1,r1,dAlice−−−−−−−−→ n1Alice
Alice
v1,r
′
1,dAlice−−−−−−−→ n2Alice
Bob
u2,r2,dBob−−−−−−−→ n1Bob
Bob
v2,r
′
2,dBob−−−−−−−→ n2Bob
All information exchange takes place securely.
iii
n1Alice
u1−→ n1Bob
n2Alice
v1−→ n2Bob
All information exchange takes place securely.
iv
n1Bob
(dBob·val1)=(dBod·(u1−u2)) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n1Alice
n2Bob
(dBod·val2)=(dBod·(v1−v2)) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n2Alice
All information exchange takes place securely.
v
n1Alice
X=D·val1=(dAlice·dBob·val1) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CS
n2Alice
Y=D·val1=(dAlice·dBob·val2) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CS
All information exchange takes place securely.
vi CS then checks the following,
if (X + Y ) mod q = 0 return “equal”
if (X + Y ) mod q < q/2 return “ > ”
else return “ < ”
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Figure 1: Schematic Representation of the flow of information (i→ii→iii→iv→v→vi) during PPC (Procedure 2).
assigned notaries in a bid to gain advantage. Thus, in such a setting, we need to verify that the values passed during the
procedure represent the actual value being compared.
We use ZKP to verify that the values passed to the notaries during Procedure 2 are the same as the random rep-
resentation of x and y. We make use of the encryptions3, E(R(x)) = (E(u1, r1), E(v1, r′1)) and E(R(y)) =
(E(u2, r2), E(v2, r
′
2)), for this. Further, let Alice’s public key be denoted by hAlice and Bob’s hBob. Procedure 3
describes the interactive ZKP with the CS as the Prover P . For this we also make use of the help values passed by Alice
and Bob to their assigned notaries in Step (ii) of Procedure 2.
We now show that the ZKP described by Procedure 3 satisfies the three properties required for a ZKP, i.e.,
• Completeness. It is trivial to see that if Eq. 2 holds, then Eq. 1 holds. That is, a honest P will be able convince
V that the comparison was correct.
• Soundness. If Eq. 2 does not hold, i.e., Alice and/or Bob misreported their values, then there can not be a
case where P can find other values except for (X + Y ) mod q, (H1) mod q and (H2) mod q for which Eq 1
holds, with high probability. This is because Pedersen commitments are computationally binding.
Discussion. This property also makes the comparison robust to any misreporting done by the notaries.
Thus, even if we further relax the assumption that the notaries are honest-but-curious, by allowing them to
strategically misreport information, Procedure 3 will allow any V to detect the misreporting. Thus, PPC
(Procedures 2 and 3) is robust to any misreporting done by the notaries.
• Zero-knowledge. It is trivial to see that, similar to the argument given for Procedure 2, V
does not gain any knowledge of the committed values or the help values through the values
(X + Y ) mod q,H1 mod q and H2 mod q. Moreover, the value E(·)z mod p does not reveal any informa-
tion about the value of z, at any stage of the procedure, because of the hardness of the discrete-log problem.
4.2 Collusion in PPC
Procedure 2 and Procedure 3 provide a secure and verifiable way for comparing two integers. The comparison requires
5 semi-honest third parties – 4 notaries and 1 CS. While Procedure 3 ensures that the method is robust to misreporting
of any value, collusion among the agents may result in loss of privacy of the values.
For instance, if both the assigned notaries to Alice/Bob collude, the privacy of the integer owned by Alice/Bob is lost.
However, this form of collusion is difficult in a real-world setting since the notaries will not be aware of each others
existence in the comparison. This is because, from Procedure 2 or Figure 1, there is no line of communication between
two notaries of the type nij ,∀i ∈ {1, 2} where j is either Alice or Bob.
3DSIC mechanisms can be used to ensure that strategic agents report the encryption of their true value (bid/vote etc.) in this step.
We illustrate the same with TPACAS (Section 5).
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Procedure 3: ZKP for PPC
1 CS has X and Y from Procedure 2.
2 CS then asks the assigned notaries to compute among them the following,
n1Alice
(dAlice·r1) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−→ n1Bob
(D·r1) mod q−−−−−−−−−→ CS
n2Alice
(dAlice·r′1) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−→ n2Bob
(D·r′1) mod q−−−−−−−−−→ CS
n1Bob
(dBob·r2) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−→ n1Alice
(D·r2) mod q−−−−−−−−−→ CS
n2Bob
(dBob·r′2) mod q−−−−−−−−−−−→ n2Alice
(D·r′2) mod q−−−−−−−−−→ CS
Here, D = (dAlice · dBob) mod q. Further, all information exchange takes place securely.
3 CS asks n1Alice to calculate and send the value E(u1, r1)
dAlice mod p. CS then asks n1Bob to calculate and send the
value E(u1, r1)dAlice·dBob mod p. Similarly for commitments E(u2, r2), E(v1, r′1) and E(v2, r
′
2).
4 Let,
C = E(u1, r1)
D · E(u2, r2)−D· E(v1, r′1)D · E(v2, r′2)−D (mod p).
Observe that,
C = E(u1, r1)
D · E(u2, r2)−D · E(v1, r′1)D · E(v2, r′2)−D
= (gu1hr1Alice)
D · (gu2hr2Bob)−D ·
(
gv1h
r′1
Alice
)D
·
(
gv2h
r′2
Bob
)−D
= gD·(u1−u2+v1−v2) · hD·(r1+r′1)Alice · h−D·(r2+r
′
2)
Bob
C = g(X+Y ) mod q · hH1 mod qAlice · hH2 mod qBob (mod p) (1)
5 V accepts that
(X + Y ) mod q = (D · (x− y)) mod q
H1 mod q = (D · (r1 + r′1)) mod q
H2 mod q = − (D · (r2 + r′2)) mod q
}
(2)
only if Eq. 1 holds.
However, if any one of the two assigned notaries to Alice as well as Bob collude with CS, i.e., 3 out of 5 parties, then
the privacy of both the integers is lost. This follows similar to other third party secure protocols like [37, 30, 38]. Thus,
PPC is collusion resistant unless the CS is part of the collusion.
4.3 PPC Illustration
We now illustrate the verifiable comparison of two integers in PPC (Procedures 2 and 3) with an example. Let, the
values to be compared be 7 owned by Alice, and 6 owned by Bob with dmax = 5. Further, let p = 1187, q = 593, g =
3, aAlice = 2, aBob = 3, hAlice = 9 and hBob = 27. Let, dAlice = 2 and dBob = 3. We have 7, 6 < 5932·52 .
With this, 7 can be represented as the pair (350, 250) with E(R(7)) = ((350, 11), (250, 4)) and 6 can be represented
as the pair (300, 299) with E(R(6)) = ((300, 12), (299, 15)). The following steps describe the verifiable comparison
in PPC.
• Alice and Bob send E(R(7)) and E(R(6)) to CS.
• Alice sends the pair of values (350, 11 · 2, 2) to n1Alice and the pair of values (250, 4 · 2, 2) to n2Alice. Similarly,
Bob sends (300, 12 · 3, 3) to n1Bob and (299, 15 · 3, 3) to n2Bob.
Comparison.
• n1Alice sends 350 to n1Bob and n2Alice sends 250 to n2Bob.
• n1Bob sends 3 · 50 to n1Alice and n2Bob sends 3 · 544 to n2Alice.
• n1Alice calculates D · val1 = 2 · 3 · 50 or D · val1 mod q = 300 and n2Alice calculates D · val2 = 2 · 3 · 544 or
D · val2 mod q = 299. The notaries send their respective values to the CS.
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• CS calculates D · (val1 + val2) mod q = X + Y mod q = 300 + 299 = 6 < q/2. Hence, CS returns the
result 7 > 6.
Verification.
• CS shows V that
C =
(
3350 · 322)6 · (3300 · 336)−6 ·(
3250 · 38)6 · (3299 · 345)−6
= 3453 · 3356 · 3362 · 3308 (mod 1187)
= 410 · 33 · 317 · 682 (mod 1187) = 899
• CS asks the assigned the notaries to send the values D · (r1), D · (r′1), D · (r2) and D · (r′2) as described in
Procedure 3. CS already has X and Y .
• We have D · (r1) = 66, D · (r′1) = 24, D · (r2) = 72 and D · (r′2) = 90. This information exchange takes
place securely.
• CS computesH1 = D(r1+r′1) = (66+24) mod 593 = 90 andH2 = −D(r2+r′2) = −(72+90) mod 593 =
431.
• CS shows the following,
gX+Y · hH1Alice · hH2Bob = 36 · 990 · 27431 (mod 1187)
= 729 · 592 · 181 (mod 1187)
= 899 = C
• Hence, V is convinced that the comparison was for the same values as the ones committed by Alice and Bob.
We now use PPC introduced for secure comparison of two integers to present a novel, secure combinatorial auction for
the single-minded case that preserves the privacy of each agent’s bidding information even after the bidding phase is
over, namely, TPACAS.
5 TPACAS Auction Protocol
In TPACAS, A is set of agents wherein AU is the seller itself, and all arithmetic operations (except the payments) are
modulo p for the commitments and modulo q for the values to be committed as well as the help values. Further, AU
acts as the CS. We assume that AU and the set of notaries are honest-but-curious, while the bidders are also strategic
as described in Section 4.1.2. Before describing the secure auction protocol, we define the following with respect to
TPACAS:
• Item Bundle. In TPACAS, an agent bi submits its item bundle Sbi , consisting of commitments of its preferred
items at least once as well as different commitments of some (or all) of their preferred items randomly such
that |Sbi | = m, ∀bi ∈ B. Formally,
Definition 10 (Item Bundle). An agent bi’s item bundle is defined as Sbi = {C ∪D} where C ={E(R(j)) | ∀j ∈ Sbi} and D = {E(R(k)) | ∀k ∈ S′bi},
where S′bi is the set of non-distinct items randomly chosen from Sbi such that |C|+ |D| = m.
• Secure Bulletin Board. Secure Bulletin Boards (SBB) consists of publicly known websites which are
controlled by AU . All data published is time stamped and cannot be erased. AU uses the SBB to publish
all public information about the auction, including the initial auction announcement as well as (committed)
information that have been submitted and proofs that can be used to verify all publicly available information
about the outcome. The content of the SBB is viewable to all participating agents – and all are assured that
they are viewing the same content. For example, the SBB can be a smart contract over blockchain, since all
the values submitted on a smart contract will be on a publicly distributed ledger such as on the Ethereum
blockchain.
Protocol 1 illustrates the TPACAS auction protocol presented. Note that, while we require didbi ∈ [1, dmax],∀idbi ,
we do not require any such bound4 on d′idbi ,∀idbi . Figure 2 summarizes the information flow among the participating
agents during the execution of the protocol, schematically.
4This step ensures that no information about the items being compared is revealed (Section 5.2).
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Protocol 1: TPACAS Auction
1 AU sets up the auction by announcing p, q, g, and dmax (or Dmax) as well as the items being auctioned.
2 At the start of the auction, every agent a ∈ A \ {AU} gives its public id’s to AU upon which AU assigns to every
agent a a secret identifier ida, securely. These are known only to AU and not to any other agent.
3 AU generates a random id for each item which is known to every agent but not to notaries. The agents commit these
ids instead of directly committing their preferred set of items. The ids can be greater than q/2, as to compare items
we only need to check if they are equal.
4 AU assigns a pair of notaries (n1idbi , n
2
idbi
) ∈ N to every agent idbi ∈ B randomly.
Bidding Phase:
5 (a) ∀ idbi ∈ B, submits its bid tuple, i.e., BTidbi =
〈
E(ϑidbi ), E(|Sidbi |), E
(
R(ϑidbi/
√
|Sidbi |)
)
to AU . Each
agent’s widbi = ϑidbi/
√
|Sidbi | must be less than q2·Dmax . Every idbi also submits its item bundle Sidbi . (b) AU
publishes the bid tuple and the item bundle on the SBB for non-repudiation.
Post-Bidding Phase:
6 Each agent idbi ∈ B sends the random representations of the value widbi as well as the random representation of all the
commitments in Sidbi , along with the help values of their commitments and their private integers to their assigned
notaries, i.e., idbi sends
(
u, r, didbi , d
′
idbi
)
to n1idbi and
(
v, r′, didbi , d
′
idbi
)
to n2idbi for the value widbi as well as its
item bundle. All information exchange takes place securely.
7 (a) AU determines – in co-ordination with the assigned notaries – the set of the winning agents W , consisting of each
winner’s identifier, and calculates payments as described in ICA-SM, and (b) publishes it on the SBB.
5.1 Bid Initialization
AU sorts the bids based on the values widbi ∀idbi , using any comparison based sorting with the comparison done
through Procedure 2 with the private values didbi ,∀idbi .
For the winner and payment determination phase, the highest agent’s identifier is denoted as idb1 , the second highest
agent’s as idb2 , and so on. Let I consist of the set of identifiers {idb1 , . . . , idbnˆ}, S as the set of preferred item bundles
of every agent {Sidb1 , . . . ,Sidbnˆ } and W as the set of winners initialized to ∅.
5.2 Winner Determination
AU carries out winner determination, as described in Algorithm 1, in co-ordination with notaries. In this, the highest
agent is automatically selected, and its identifier is added to W . To determine the other winners, AU compares every
pair of item, ∀ idbj ∈ I \ {idb1} with every idbk currently in W , using Procedure 2 with the private values d′idbi ,∀idbi .
If AU does not find any identical pair of items for an agent idbj for every idbk currently in W i.e.,
Sidbj ∩ (∪k∈W Sidbk ) = ∅, it adds idbj to W . Otherwise, it discards that agent and continues with the next
highest agent.
Discussion. As the set of items M is finite, i.e., there are only
(
m
2
)
distinct combinations possible, AU can determinis-
tically get the items, x and y, being compared from the value val1 + val2, i.e., x − y. By using PPC and imposing
no restriction5 on the values d′idbi ,∀idbi , however, if x 6= y, i.e., X + Y 6= 0, all possible
(
m
2
)
combinations will be
equally likely.
5.3 Payment Determination
The payments for every winner idbi ∈W are as described in Algorithm 1. AU can find out an agent idbj , ∀ idbi ∈W ,
where j is the smallest index such that Sidbi ∩ Sidbj 6= ∅, and an agent idbk for k < j, idbk 6= idbi such that
Sidbk ∩ Sidbj = ∅, similar to the procedure to the winner determination described in Section 5.2. If such idbj and idbk
exists, then AU asks the assigned notary n1idbj of idbj to calculate the payment σidbi = ϑidbj /
√
|Sidbj |/|Sidbi |. The
5We do not need to restrict the value of dmax for item comparison, as we are only interested in knowing whether the items are
the same, i.e., whether x− y = 0 or not. This ensures that X + Y does not leak the bound for x− y.
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the information flow during the execution of TPACAS.
agent idbj opens its commitment E(R(widbj )) for n
1
idbj
, securely. AU asks idbi to open its commitment for E(|Sidbi |),
and sends the value to n1idbj , which calculates σidbi and sends it to AU . If no such idbj or idbk exist, then σidbi = 0.
6 TPACAS Analysis
It is trivial to see that TPACAS preserves non-repudiation. We now look at verifiability and the nature of the privacy
guarantees as provided by TPACAS. In this section, we denote the identifier idbi ∈ B as bi for simplicity of notation.
6.1 Verifiability
A prover P (AU ) proves to a verifier V the correctness of the order wb1 ≥ · · · ≥ wbnˆ and the correctness of the
comparisons for Sbi ∩ Sbj = ∅, for each bi, bj ∈ B.
As all value as well as item comparisons in TPACAS, are done using PPC (Procedure 2), the ZKP for the comparisons
follows the same as described in Procedure 3.
Discussion. Since Pedersen commitments are computationally binding, V is sure of the comparison without the need to
be shown multiple proofs for different commitments of the same values, for value as well as item comparisons. This
significantly reduces the computational time as compared to other secure auction protocols such as [15]. We further
analyze this in Section 6.3.1.
6.2 Privacy Analysis
TPACAS provides the following privacy guarantees:
Proposition 1. TPACAS preserves agent privacy.
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Proof. In TPACAS, first all the agents communicate with AU over a secure channel indicating their interest in
the auction. AU assigns a random id to all the agents which are used through-out the execution of TPACAS for
communication. Thus, there is no step in the protocol from which the agent identities will be leaked unless AU leaks
the identities.
In case the SBB is a smart contract, agent privacy is preserved by leveraging the fact that public addresses of participating
agents are pseudo-anonymous i.e., these addresses can not be linked to the real-world identity of the agents with high
probability.
Proposition 2. TPACAS preserves each agent’s bid privacy.
Proof. Each agent is required to submit only the Pedersen commitments of their bids, which are information-theoretically
hiding. Hence, it is impossible for any malicious agent to open a Pedersen commitment to reveal a message x ∈ Zq,
other than through a brute force attack. Let |q| be the number of bits required to represent the prime q, then the
probability that an agent can open a commitment this way is of the order 1/2|q|.
Typically, 64 bits are enough to represent each agent’s bid valuation while |q| is chosen to be 1024 bits. Thus, we have
1/2|
q
2·Dmax |  1/ϑbi ∀bi.
Proposition 3. TPACAS preserves bid and bid-topology privacy from the notaries.
Proof. Since each individual notary will only know one value (either u or v) of its assigned agent bi’s wbi or Sbi and
assuming they do not collude among each other or with AU , TPACAS preserves the bid and bid-topology privacy from
the notaries.
Proposition 4. In TPACAS, the probability with which AU can know at least one item in agent bj’s bid-topology is
1/sbi . The probability with which AU can know the complete bid-topology of an agent bj is,
Pbj (sbi) =
1
2m − 2m−sbi (3)
∀bj ∈ B \W , such that bi ∈W is that agent for which Sbj ∩ Sbi 6= ∅ in Step 2 of Algorithm 1, sbi = |Sbi | and m is
the number of items.
Proof. AU , through the bidding topology of the winners and its knowledge about which agents have at least one item
in common, can infer some information about the bid-topology of an agent bj ∈ B \W .
With this, AU can know that bj’s bid-topology consists of at least one item belonging to bi’s preferred bundle of items,
Sbi . The probability with which AU can figure that item is 1/sbi .
Further, with this information, AU can eliminate all possible subsets of M which do not consist of any item in Sbi .
Then the probability with which TPACAS leaks each agent bj’s bid-topology to AU is given by Eq. 3, as all the
remaining subsets i.e., 2m − 2m−sbi are equally likely.
From Eq. 3, TPACAS preserves bid-topology privacy with high probability when sbi ≥ 2,∀bi ∈W . For the analysis of
the result, observe that Eq. 3 can be written as,
Pbj (sbi) =
1
2m − 2m−sbi
=
1
2m
(
1
1− 1/2sbi
)
=
2sbi
2sbi − 1
(
1
2m
)
.
Thus, the increase in the probability with which AU can determine the complete bid-topology of an agent with respect
to randomly guessing the complete bid-topology is by a constant factor, i.e., by 2
sbi
2
sbi−1 . Assuming that each agent’s
bundle size is ≥ 2, the worst case follows when sbi = 2. The probability that AU can know the complete bid-topology
of an agent bj in this case is,
Pbj (sbi) =
4
3
(
1
2m
)
,
which is an increase by a factor 43 or an increase by 33.33% of O(
1
2m ) which is negligible in m.
The probability result follows from the fact that at no point during the auction or post-auction and ∀bj ∈ B \W , the
cardinality of the preferred bundle of items of an agent bj i.e., sbj , is revealed to AU in TPACAS. Note that, Eq. 3 does
not hold for an auction protocol that leaks the cardinality of Sbj of an agent bj . For instance, if AU knew that for an
agent bj , sbj = m, the probability with which agent bj’s bid-topology is leaked to AU would be 1.
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nˆ m Upper Bound Mean Mean Time
(
√
m)
(
Opt Welfare
Approx Welfare
)
Taken (min)
25 9 3 1.11905993576 2.1826
25 12 3.4641 1.1313692063 5.21355
25 15 3.8729 1.05711039103 11.103467
100 9 3 - 11.59642
100 12 3.4641 - 19.72178
100 15 3.8729 - 54.084380
Table 1: TPACAS approximation bound for 25 random auction instances for each.
6.2.1 Collusion
In TPACAS, the participating agents may collude amongst one other, in an effort to change the outcome of the auction
or know the bidding information of other agents. Since every assigned notary receives any bidding information of its
assigned agent after the end of the bidding phase; and because TPACAS satisfies non-repudiation, the agents in collusion
with it cannot alter any of their submitted information. Further, due to verifiability and non-repudiate property of
TPACAS, any set of colluding agents cannot strategically change or ask an agent to withdraw any submitted information.
Thus, collusion in TPACAS cannot affect the outcome of the auction. Such a collusion may, however, reveal bidding
information of agent(s) depending on the type and the number of agents which are colluding. For instance, if both the
assigned notaries of an agent bi i.e., 3 out 5 parties in Procedure 2, colludes with AU , the bid-topology of agent bi will
be revealed to AU . Further, as D will be different for each comparison, if at least one notary from every pair (n out of
2n) colludes with AU , AU will know the bid-topology of every agent. This follows similar to other third-party secure
protocols such as [30] and [37].
Note that the protocol is resilient to collusion among the notaries, as there is no line of communication between two
notaries of the type nibj ,∀i ∈ {1, 2} for each bj ∈ B.
Theorem 1. TPACAS is trustworthy implementation of ICA-SM.
Proof. Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4 show that TPACAS preserves agent, bid and bid-topology privacy with high probability
(the probablity of guessing improves only by O( 12m )) and is non-repudiate and verifiable. Since the protocol also solves
the winner and payment determination problem through ICA-SM, it is DSIC and ex-post IR. Thus, the theorem follows
from Definition 9.
6.3 Implementation
We now look at some implementation aspects of TPACAS. For implementation, to avoid any floating-point number,
AU can announce at the start of the auction, that the value wbi for every agent bi, will have x-precision i.e., each value
wbi will be significant up to x decimal places.
6.3.1 Simulation Analysis
For the implementation, all auction instances were generated as CATS file using SATS command line tool [39]. The
optimal social welfare was calculated by solving the winner determination problem for the general single-minded case
through FRODO 2.0 [40]. For this, the generated file was parsed through the inbuilt FRODO 2.0 parser to convert CATS
to XCSP. This parsed file can be solved using any of the optimal algorithms (such as DPOP, P-DPOP etc.) provided in
FRODO 2.0 (through GUI or command line).
The primes p and q were of size 1024 bits. Table 1 shows the results. Note that, for large nˆ it is difficult to calculate
the optimal welfare, as the problem is NP-Hard. The results show the practicality of the trade-off in TPACAS i.e., the
protocol is not losing significant revenue for a substantial decrease in computational time.
The mean time taken for TPACAS in Table 1 includes the verification of every value and item comparison done
throughout the execution of TPACAS. The verification of these comparisons (Procedure 3) is the only computationally
expensive operation in TPACAS. However the time consumed for verification of the value as well as item comparisons,
is significantly less as compared to other secure auction protocols such as [15].
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For comparison, a 100 bid single item auction (i.e., nˆ = 100 and m = 1) takes approximately 2.51 hours in [15] (see
[15, Table 2]), while a 100 bid single minded combinatorial auction (i.e., nˆ = 100) even with m = 15, only takes
approximately 0.91 hours in TPACAS.
6.3.2 Implementation over Blockchain
Figure 3: Schematic representation of the flow of information in TPACAS, when the SBB is a smart contract.
Towards this, the SBB will be implemented as a smart contract. The agents (including the notaries) register themselves
for the auction through their public addresses, which acts as their random id’s. AU generates a random id for the items.
AU sends the id’s to every agent securely and off-chain. Further, AU assigns each agent a pair of distinct notaries
off-chain. The agents submit their bid tuples and their item bundle on the smart contract. The agents also submit some
of their bidding information, as described in the TPACAS Protocol, off-chain to their assigned notaries.
For the winner and payment determination, AU , through communication with the notaries determines the set of
winners off-chain. Figure 3 illustrates the information flow during execution of the TPACAS protocol over blockchain,
schematically. In Figure 3, the solid arrows represent steps conducted on-chain, i.e., Step 1(a), Step 1(b), Step 4 and
Step 6(b). The dashed arrows represent steps conducted off-chain, i.e., Step 2, Step 3, Step 5 and Step 6(a).
Notary Fees. We suggest to pay the notaries by implementing the SBB as a smart contract over blockchain, which shall
act as an incentive for them to not alter with any information, since that would be detected and they would not be paid.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a practical, robust and verifiable solution to the Yao’s Millionaires’ Problem, namely, PPC (Procedures
2 and 3). PPC uses semi-honest third parties to securely compare two integers, who do not learn any information. PPC
achieves this comparison in constant time as well as in one execution of Procedure 2. Further, we show that PPC is
collusion resistant.
To demonstrate the significance of PPC, we use it to design a secure combinatorial auction auction protocol, namely,
TPACAS. TPACAS is practical, strategic proof, verifiable and preserves bidding information with high probability.
TPACAS preserves an agent’s bid valuation as well as bid-topology at any time during the auction and post-auction, even
to the auctioneer, unlike previous secure combinatorial auctions. The bid-topology is preserved with high probability
when every agent’s bundle size is ≥ 2, which is a fair assumption in practice for combinatorial auctions. Also, we
illustrate how to execute TPACAS over a publicly distributed ledger such as blockchain.
We believe that PPC can be further used to implement other privacy-preserving mechanisms including different types of
auctions, voting etc.
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